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Recent studies have shown that children as young as age 3% use category 
membership as the basis of their inductive inferences. The present studies ex- 
amine how children determine which category-based inductive inferences are 
warranted and which are unwarranted. Preschool and elementary school children 
learned various facts (e.g., “This apple has pectin inside”) and reported whether 
they thought the facts generalized to other items varying in similarity to the target 
(e.g., other apples, a banana, and a stereo). Categories included both natural 
kinds and artifacts and varied as to how similar category members were to one 
another (category homogeneity, as rated by adults). Results indicate that even the 
youngest children placed certain constraints on their inferences. However, the 
preschoolers made few principled distinctions among categories, basing their in- 
ferences primarily on category homogeneity. In contrast, older children made 
several distinctions that seemed based on domain-specific knowledge. Most im- 
portantly, they drew more inferences within natural kinds than within artifact 
categories, at times even overextending the distinction. Comparison with other 
research suggests that increasing scientific knowledge exerts powerful effects on 
patterns of induction within basic-level categories. 6 1988 Academic PESS, IIIC. 
This paper focuses on children’s inductive inferences and presents evi- 
dence that constraints on category-based inductions emerge early in de- 
velopment and undergo marked changes with age. Much of human rea- 
soning involves induction, or the process of making inferences that ex- 
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tend beyond the available evidence (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Tha- 
gard, 1986; Skyrms, 1975). Inductive inferences are often based on the 
use of categories. That is, we often expect facts that are true of one cate- 
gory member to hold true of other category members as well. For ex- 
ample, we expect many categories to capture facts concerning internal 
parts (all tigers have the same number of bones), chemical structure (all 
water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen), behaviors (all fish breathe 
through gills), or other nonobvious properties. Importantly, these infer- 
ences sometimes conflict with superficial appearances. Even among out- 
wardly dissimilar objects (e.g., typical lizards and legless lizards), 
common category membership can be critical for guiding inductive infer- 
ences . 
Given the importance of categories for induction, a large body of devel- 
opmental data and theory would predict that young children would not be 
able to use categories to make inferences about novel cases (either as 
they confront them or as they have to make predictions). Young children 
typically depend on superficial perceptual and functional properties to 
make judgments of similarity on classification tasks, free recall, free as- 
sociations, and word definitions (Flavell, 1985; Mansfield, 1977). Further- 
more, much of preschoolers’ scientific knowledge is quite limited (Carey, 
1982, 1985; Keil, 1979, 1986). An appreciation for the inductive power of 
categories could require a mature understanding of science, since scien- 
tific knowledge and theory provide the rationale for mature category 
groupings. 
Despite widespread assumptions that children cannot form mature cat- 
egories or look beyond the obvious (Wellman & Gelman, in press), there 
is recent evidence that preschool children expect categories to promote 
inductions (Gelman, Collman, & Maccoby, 1986; Gelman & Markman, 
1986, 1987). Young children use category membership to predict under- 
lying similarities among objects-even when perceptual similarity would 
lead to a different prediction. Gelman and Markman conducted a series of 
studies with 3- and 4-year-olds, examining children’s inductive inferences 
with items that pitted category membership against perceptual similarity. 
On each of a series of problems, children were shown two objects and 
were taught a new fact about each. They then had to infer which of the 
facts applied to a third object that looked very much like one of the first 
two objects but was given the same category label as the other one. For 
example, on one problem children saw a tropical fish and were told that it 
breathes underwater. They saw a dolphin and were told it pops out of the 
water to breathe. They then had to decide how a second fish, a shark that 
looked like a dolphin, would breathe. 
Children relied on category membership to draw inductions even 
though perceptual similarity would lead to a different conclusion. For 
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example, 4-year-olds usually inferred that the two fish breathe the same 
way. The use of identical labels cannot account for the results. In a later 
study category members were given synonymous (nonidentical) labels 
(e.g., “rabbit” and “bunny”), and children again drew inferences most 
often from one category member to another (Gelman & Markman, 1986). 
Even when no labels were used, children often drew inferences based on 
category membership rather than appearances (Gelman & Markman, 
1987). 
These studies demonstrate that preschool children expect certain cate- 
gories to have a richly correlated structure that goes beyond superficial 
appearances. Thus, the problem of children’s use of categories for induc- 
tion must be construed an alternative way. Without constraints, inductive 
reasoning is too powerful and will produce unwarranted generalizations 
(Goodman, 1955; see also Sternberg, 1982). Instead of asking when chil- 
dren first begin to use categories as the basis of inductive inferences, the 
question becomes how children limit their inductive inferences from cate- 
gories. In other words, when do children distinguish among categories in 
the inferences they draw? The present studies examine this question, fo- 
cusing on two concerns: What are children’s early inferences based on? 
For example, do certain categories have a special status for promoting 
inductions? And how do patterns of category-based induction change 
with development? 
To answer these questions, it helps to consider some ways in which 
categories differ from one another. Below I discuss two category vari- 
ables that have been proposed to be significant in constraining induc- 
tions: category homogeneity and object naturalness. These variables rep- 
resent an important contrast: homogeneity is defined in terms of simi- 
larity, without reference to the actual content of the category; naturalness 
is defined specifically in terms of category content. In addition to these 
category variables, it is also necessary to consider the kinds of properties 
involved. Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda (1983) point out that infer- 
ences about properties from categories vary as a function of both the 
category and property in question. For example, whether we generalize a 
new property from one bird to another of the same species will depend on 
whether the property concerns nesting pattern or color. Accordingly, 
property variables are discussed in relation to each category variable. 
Together, these distinctions provide the framework for Study 1. 
Category homogeneity. At minimum, a category that promotes induc- 
tions is structured so that category members are similar to one another on 
certain important dimensions. Objects that appear to be very similar in 
their known properties (thus forming “homogeneous” categories) may 
often share underlying similarities as well. For example, zebras appar- 
ently share many obvious similarities; appropriately, the class of zebras 
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promotes many novel inductions. Conversely, various “striped things” 
differ radically from one another on all dimensions besides stripedness 
and do not promote novel inductions. There are deep problems with pre- 
cisely and objectively pinning down the notion of similarity (see Quine, 
1969; Murphy & Medin, 1985). Nonetheless, gross differences in intuitive 
similarity, on a purely subjective basis, could predict how well a category 
promotes novel inferences. 
A set of studies by Rips (1975) suggests the importance of similarity for 
inductive reasoning. Rips examined how the patterns of people’s infer- 
ences reflect the “family resemblance” structure of categories. In his 
task subjects were told a novel fact, that a certain species of animal had a 
particular disease. They then were asked to estimate what proportion of 
various other animal species had the same disease. Rips found that adults 
generalized from one species to another based on how similar the species 
are to each other. For example, they were more likely to generalize from 
eagles to hawks than from eagles to ducks; they were more likely to gen- 
eralize from geese to ducks than from geese to hawks. 
The importance of category homogeneity leads to the straightforward 
prediction that superordinate-level categories will not promote as many 
inferences as less inclusive categories within the same hierarchy (see 
Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976, for discussion of 
different levels within a hierarchy). More specific categories within a hi- 
erarchy are more homogeneous; for example, “rocking chair” is a more 
homogeneous category than “chair,” which is a more homogeneous cate- 
gory than “furniture.” It would be reasonable to expect children to draw 
inferences differently, depending on category level. Basic-level categories 
are especially easy for children to learn; superordinates are especially 
difficult (Markman & Callanan, 1984). Accordingly, the basic level may 
have special status for promoting children’s inferences. 
Beyond the predictions based on category level, however, there are 
serious limitations to the idea that perceived homogeneity predicts 
whether a category promotes inductions. Most troublesome is that induc- 
tions depend partly on theoretical considerations, beyond what is directly 
observable (see Carey, 1985; Goodman, 1955 for more detailed discus- 
sion). Inductions are influenced by how much variation is considered 
possible within a category, a judgment that is determined by our theories. 
For example, the fur color of giraffes will reliably promote inferences far 
into the future, whereas car color in the 1920s (then reliably black) pro- 
jected only a few years ahead. Furthermore, a distinction must be made 
between outer, observable properties and those that are more internal or 
less obvious. As discussed earlier, outer properties are not always a reli- 
able guide to those that are less obvious. 
In short, adults’ inductive inferences are partly dependent on a more 
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complex set of considerations than homogeneity alone. Nonetheless, ho- 
mogeneity could serve as a useful guide when different levels within a 
hierarchy are compared. 
Naturalness. A second distinction concerns whether a category con- 
sists of naturally occurring objects (natural kinds) or human-made arti- 
facts. An object is natural if it was not constructed by humans.’ The 
distinction between natural kinds and artifacts is not a clear-cut one, as 
there are many borderline cases (e.g., domesticated animals; cultivated 
fruits; mineral alloys). Furthermore, as discussed below, many artifacts 
seem to function like natural kinds in how readily they promote infer- 
ences (e.g., computers are as complex as natural kinds; plastics have 
predictable chemical structures). Thus, there is probably a continuum 
rather than a strict dichotomy between natural kinds and artifacts, in the 
number of inferences they promote. 
With these caveats in mind, however, naturalness may be an important 
predictor of the extent to which a category permits inductive generaliza- 
tions. One reason is that natural kinds are susceptible to scientific study 
(e.g., biology, chemistry, geology), whereas artifacts have traditionally 
not been (Simon, 1981). One purpose of a scientific theory is to discover 
and organize sets of nonobvious information. 
Of course, it is possible to study artifacts scientifically (in computer 
science, archeology, etc.). However, the scientific study of artifacts 
differs fundamentally from the scientific study of natural kinds (Simon, 
1981). Artifacts cannot be studied in and of themselves; they depend cru- 
cially on their environment for their functioning. In other words, what 
scientists can study are not properties inherent to the artifact object it- 
self, but rather properties that emerge from the interaction between an 
object and its environment.2 
t For philosophical discussion of the natural kind-artifact distinction, see Schwartz 
(1977, 1979). Psychological studies of the distinction have been rare (see Barr & Caplan, 
1983; Caplan & Barr, 1985; Keil, 1986; Keil & Batterman, 1984; Malt, 1985). Naturalness is 
ascribed to objects taken individually; however, categories of naturally occurring objects 
need not be natural kinds. For example, the set of all objects named by a live-letter word in 
English includes naturally occurring objects (such as whales), but otherwise does not func- 
tion like a natural kind. Here, the term “natural kind” is used to refer to (at least) basic- 
level categories of naturally occurring objects. 
z One possible objection at this point is that even simple artifacts are studied by experts, 
albeit nonscientists. (For example, a dress designer knows many things about dresses.) 
Therefore, it certainly is the case that experts have knowledge about artifacts that extends 
beyond what the average person knows. It remains to be seen whether expertise concerning 
artifacts is as cohesive as that concerning natural kinds. Artifacts are inherently varied (see 
below), and knowledge of this variation must comprise much of the expertise in the field. It 
may be that artifact experts learn complex sets of distinctions, whereas natural kind experts 
learn more general laws describing entire categories. 
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Another hallmark of natural kinds is that they imply a particular in- 
ternal structure (genetic or chemical), whereas single artifact terms do 
not. For example, an apple cannot be made of wood or plastic (unless it is 
fake), whereas a doll can be made of wood, plastic, cloth, or even dried 
apple. As long as the substance or structure remains the same, a partic- 
ular natural entity retains its identity across varied forms (e.g., a silver 
dollar is still silver when melted) whereas an artifact does not (e.g., a 
silver dollar is no longer a dollar when melted). Although some artifact 
categories are constrained to include only a particular substance (e.g., all 
cotton blouses are made out of cotton), such categories are specially 
marked by language, in that they do not receive basic-level names. Im- 
portantly, internal substance and structure are nonobvious to unaided 
perception and often must be inferred. 
Rather than capture internal structure, artifacts tend to capture func- 
tions. This is significant for two reasons: first, functions are generally 
well known and obvious, compared to the internal structure of an object. 
Second, as long as the function is carried out, then all else can vary, 
including shape, material, and internal parts. With new technology, arti- 
facts can be made of new materials (such as plastic), can change size (for 
example, tape recorders have gotten smaller), or can change overall 
shape and internal parts (e.g., airplanes). With shifting fashions, artifacts 
can change style and color (e.g., hats, cars). Someone can invent an en- 
tirely new subtype of an artifact (witness the dramatic changes in com- 
puters over the past 30 years). In contrast, natural kinds are constrained 
by their genetic or molecular structure to reach a certain size, to have a 
certain color, to have a certain set of parts. Although natural kinds do 
undergo evolutionary changes, they are much more gradual and are often 
considered to signal a change in kind (e.g., birds are descended from 
dinosaurs but are not themselves considered to be dinosaurs). 
The present experiments were designed to discover when (if ever) chil- 
dren draw principled distinctions among categories and among proper- 
ties, in the inferences they draw. In Studies 1 and 2, children were given 
an induction task modeled on Rips (1975) and Carey (1985). For each of a 
series of problems, children were taught a new fact (for example, that a 
particular rabbit has a spleen) and had to decide whether the fact applied 
to other objects as well (e.g., other rabbits, a dog, a telephone). Both the 
type of category and the type of property were varied and included both 
domain-general and domain-specific distinctions. Domain-general factors 
include category homogeneity (how similar category members are to one 
another, relative to their dissimilarities) and property generalizability 
(whether a property is accidental or enduring). Domain-specific factors 
include object naturalness, object complexity, and property content (e.g., 
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internal parts versus function). In order to provide a basis of comparison 
with Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 examines children’s understanding of the 
literal distinction between natural kinds and artifacts (that only natural 
kinds are naturally occurring). 
Preschoolers and second graders were studied. Preschoolers were 
chosen primarily because they have not yet undergone formal schooling 
and therefore have relatively untutored scientific beliefs. Second graders 
provide an interesting comparison age, given findings by Carey (1985) 
and Keil (1986), indicating that there is a marked reorganization in scien- 
tific knowledge between preschool and early elementary school. 
STUDY 1: MAPPING OUT CHILDREN’S INDUCTIVE INFERENCES 
Subjects 
Method 
One hundred twenty-eight children (64 preschoolers, 64 second graders) participated in 
the study, 96 of whom also took part in Study 3 (see below). Sixteen children of each age 
participated in each condition (see Properties, below). Subjects were randomly assigned to 
conditions3 with the constraint that conditions were roughly equated for age and distribu- 
tion of boys and girls. Mean ages of each age group were: equally generalizable condition 
(4-8 and 7-10); generalizable for natural kinds condition (4-S and 7- 11); generalizable for 
artifacts condition (4-8 and 8-O); and nongeneralizable condition (4-7 and 8-O). 
Categories and Exemplars 
Table 1 presents the categories and exemplars used in all conditions of Study 1. Each 
child was tested on 18 sets of items: 9 natural kinds and 9 artifacts. To ensure that we 
sampled from a wide range of items, we included three categories at each of three levels of 
complexity, for both natural kinds and artifacts. Complexity ratings were gathered from 16 
adults. Subjects were instructed to rate each of a series of items on a scale of 1 to 9 (1 = 
simple; 9 = complex). “Complex” was defined as “has many different parts and compli- 
cated internal workings”; “simple” was defined as “has few or no different parts and a 
more uniform internal structure.” The mean complexity ratings and standard deviations of 
the target items at each level are, for natural kinds: animals (A4 = 6.29, SD = 2.04), vegeta- 
tion (M = 4.19, SD = 2.02), and substances (M = 2.25, SD = 1.33); for artifacts: complex 
(M = 6.27, SD = 1.65), medium-complex (M = 3.23, SD = 1.46), and simple (M = 1.65, 
SD = 0.86). 
On every set, the experimenter taught a new fact about one picture, the target picture. 
The child was then tested on four probe pictures, to determine how far he or she generalized 
the new piece of information. The four probe pictures included (with examples for the target 
picture daffodil): 
(a) same category and appearance as target (another daffodil), 
(b) same category but different appearance than target (rose), 
3 The generalizable for artifacts condition was conducted separately, a few weeks fol- 
lowing the other conditions. However, the schools were drawn from a comparable popula- 
tion of children in the same city and socioeconomic class. 
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TABLE 1 
Target and Probe Items Used in Study 1 
Natural kinds 
Rabbit (brown a, white rabbit, dog, phone) 
Fish (yellow fish, red fish, turtle, couch) 
Spider (small &, big spider, bee, spoon) 
& (red ~JJJ&, yellow apple, banana, stereo) 
Carrot (small carrot, big carrot, peas, shoe) 
Flower (daffodil [flower], rose [flower], plant, bowl) 
Gold (bar of gold, gold nugget, silver, airplane) 
Diamond (polished diamond, uncut diamond, pearl, flute) 
Water (ocean e, cup of drinking water, milk, block) 
Artifacts 
Ball (golf baJ, football, doll, pepper) 
G (teas, plastic cu p, plate, lettuce) 
Hammer (claw hammer, ball-peen hammer, saw, ant) 
Coat (rain=, fur coat, pants, snow) 
Chair (easy a, wooden chair, table, lemon) 
Guitar (acoustic guitar, electric guitar, drum, fro ) 
Clock (clock with a pendulum, digital clock, watch, salt) 
Bike(lGed b&, child’s bike, car, tree) 
mcolor TJ black-and-white TV, radio, mouse) - 
Note. Actual labels used by experimenter are underlined. 
(c) same superordinate category as target (houseplant), and 
(d) unrelated category from a different ontological category (mixing bowl). 
This set enables us to see just how far a child’s generalization has gone: within the subor- 
dinate level (daffodils only), within the basic level’ (flowers only), or within the superor- 
dinate level (plants only). It also allows us to distinguish orderly patterns from random 
guessing (such as generalizing to just the rose and the mixing bowl). Pictures included real- 
istic color drawings and photographs, mounted on 3 x 5-inch cards. 
Homogeneity Ratings 
Ratings of category homogeneity were gathered from adults to serve as a basis of compar- 
ison with children’s inductive inferences. In a preliminary study, 20 adults were asked to 
rate the homogeneity of each of 52 categories as a whole (with each subject rating 26 catego- 
ries). Subjects were given exactly 1 min to look over the entire test booklet to familiarize 
themselves with the range of categories. Then the subject rated each category one at a time. 
For each category, the subject had 15 s to think about the category (all the different sub- 
type) and how these subtypes differed from one another) and then 5 s to indicate how 
4 The substances have not been studied by Roscb and so could not be classed as basic 
level. The present studies provide an especially conservative test of a natural kind-artifact 
difference, because tree, jlower, bird, andj&h were included as basic-level natural kinds- 
all of which are fairly general categories that may at times function as superordinates; see 
Rosch ei al. (1976). 
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similar category members are to one another, on a scale of 1 (“very similar”) to 9 (“very 
different”).5 
Properties 
As discussed earlier, whether an inference is reasonable or not depends not only on the 
category but also on the property. Similarly, children’s inferences may depend on which 
facts they learn. In order to obtain a broad sample of children’s inferences, facts were 
varied systematically in terms of how readily they should promote inferences from the 
target picture. Four sorts of properties were used: equally generalizable, generalizable for 
natural kinds only, generalizable for artifacts only, and nongeneralizable. These are given in 
Table 2. Each type is described below. 
Equally generalizable. These properties should legitimately promote inferences to 
members of the same basic-level category. They are modeled on familiar (true) properties, 
but are themselves unfamiliar. For example, children already know that a rabbit likes to eat 
carrots; the unfamiliar property is, “This rabbit likes to eat alfalfa.” Each property contains 
one unfamiliar word so that children could not have known the facts beforehand. Nonethe- 
less, the properties deal with domains that are quite familiar and sensible to children (what 
rabbits like to eat, what coats are used for, what one can do with cups). 
Generalizable for natural kinds. Properties in this condition characterize the natural 
kind-artifact distinction by referring to substance, internal structure, and previous form or 
developmental stage. Four different sentence frames were used: “has (an) X inside,” 
“made out of X,” ” has parts made out of X,” and “used to be an X.” “X” was always an 
unfamiliar word. 
Generalizable for arrifacts. For some properties, most notably those describing function, 
artifact categories may promote at least as many inferences as natural kinds. Facts in this 
condition were designed to stress function and use. To accomplish this, three different sen- 
tence frames were used throughout: “used for X,” “you can X with it,” and “used to make 
X.” “ x” was always an unfamiliar word. 
Nongeneralizable. These properties should not generalize from one category member to 
another. Each involves one or more of the following: inherent variation within the individual 
(e.g., “dirty”), historical accident (e.g., “fell on the floor”), or a temporal aspect (e.g., “a 
year old”). They consist entirely of familiar words, so as to provide an especially clear case 
of nongeneralizable properties. 
Procedure 
Children were tested individually by a female experimenter. Each child was tested on all 
18 picture sets, but heard only one type of property throughout, equally generalizable, gen- 
eralizable for natural kinds, generalizable for artifacts, or nongeneralizable. The experi- 
menter explained that she was going to show the child some pictures and ask some ques- 
tions about them. The child received a sticker after each set of questions, regardless of his 
or her answers. The first item was a set of three easy warm-up questions, designed to help 
5 These ratings were based on an unconstrained task that did not specify the basis of 
subjects’ ratings. A second study was conducted to validate that subjects were rating homo- 
geneity and to control for the sort of properties that were being rated. One group of subjects 
generated properties (see Rosch & Mervis, 1973, which were then amended to remove 
idiosyncratic facts and falsehoods. A second group of subjects rated the homogeneity of 
each category with respect to each property that was generated. Such ratings correlated 
significantly with the ones reported here (at the basic level). 
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TABLE 2 
Target Properties Used in Study 1 
Equally generalizable condition 
Rabbit: likes to eat alfalfa 
Fish: needs branchias to breathe 
Spider: catches bestiolas 
Apple: can use it to make a sauce called “chutney” 
Carrot: if you eat it, it’s good for your oculis 
Flower: needs CO, to grow 
Gold: if you put it in flamma, it melts 
Diamond: sharp enough to cut vitrum 
Water: can turn into vapor 
Ball: canines (they’re a kind of animal) like to play with it 
Cup: procyons (they’re a kind of animal) can drink out of it 
Hammer: used for putting in brackets 
Coat: protects you from precipitation [pluvia] 
Chair: a vole (that’s a kind of animal) can sleep on it 
Guitar: you can play cantatas on it 
Clock: measures punctis 
Bike: needs petroleum 
TV: has a knob for verticality 
Generalizable for natural kinds condition 
Rabbit: has a spleen [omentum] inside (from Carey, 1985) 
Fish: has parts made out of calcium 
Spider: used to be a deutovum 
Apple: has pectin inside 
Carrot: made out of cellulose 
Flower: used to be a gemma 
Gold: made out of A-U 
Diamond: used to be a piece of carbon 
Water: has hydrogen inside 
Ball: has glycerine inside 
Cup: made out of ceramic [argillo] 
Hammer: used to be a piece of chalybs 
Coat: made out of Gore-tex 
Chair: has urethane inside 
Guitar: used to be a larch 
Clock: has a pondus inside 
Bike: used to be a piece of bauxite 
TV: has parts made out of quercus 
Generalizable for artifacts condition 
Rabbit: you can rollick with it 
Fish: used to make fumet 
Spider: used for expunction 
Apple: you can repast with it 
Carrot: used to make a proboscis 
Flower: used for dizening 
Gold: used to make chaplets 
Diamond: used for riving 
Water: you can depurate with it 
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Ball: you can roister with it 
Cup: used for imbibing 
Hammer: used to make apertures 
Coat: used for occulting 
Chair: you can loll with it 
Guitar: used to make diapason 
Clock: used for horology 
Bike: you can traverse with it 
TV: used to make tintamarre 
Nongeneralizable condition 
Rabbit: is cold 
Fish: has a piece of grass stuck to it 
Spider: is a year old 
Apple: has a little scratch on it 
Carrot: came from Nevada 
Flower: was in somebody’s bedroom yesterday 
Gold: is dirty 
Diamond: belongs to a doctor 
Water: some sugar fell in it this morning 
Ball: is a little dirty 
Cup: has gum stuck on the bottom 
Hammer: is a year old 
Coat: smells yucky 
Chair: came from Oregon 
Guitar: was in sombody’s kitchen yesterday 
Clock: has a little scratch 
Bike: belongs to a teacher 
TV: fell on the floor this morning 
Note. Words in brackets were used with the second graders. 
children feel confident and comfortable in answering questions, for example, “Is this [green 
bowl] green or is it yellow?” 
For each of the remaining 18 sets of items, children were taught a new fact about one 
object or substance and then were asked whether it was true of the other four items in that 
set. For example, children in the equally generalizable condition heard: “This [brown] 
rabbit likes to eat alfalfa. See this telephone? Do you think it likes to eat alfalfa, like this 
rabbit? See this [white] rabbit? Do you think it likes to eat alfalfa, like this rabbit? See this 
dog? Do you think it likes to eat alfalfa, like this rabbit? See this [brown] rabbit? Do you 
think it likes to eat alfalfa, like this rabbit?” The target picture, on which the initial fact was 
taught, was placed on the table first and remained on the table throughout the four probe 
questions in each set. The pictures corresponding to the four probe pictures were placed on 
the table one at a time, directly below the target. Each probe picture was removed from the 
table before the next one was shown. 
The order of the sets was randomized separately for each subject, as was the order of 
probe pictures within each set (e.g., whether the child saw the telephone first or the dog 
first). Before showing the child each picture card, the experimenter announced what it was, 
e.g., “Now I’m going to show you a telephone” or “Now I’m going to show you another 
76 SUSAN A. GELMAN 
rabbit.” As each picture was named, the experimenter pointed to it, to focus the child’s 
attention on the picture as well as the question. Care was taken not to stress either the 
category names or the word “this.” Throughout the session, children’s spontaneous com- 
ments were written down. 
Children were encouraged to give an answer of “yes” or “no” even when unsure. How- 
ever, children rarely expressed uncertainty (e.g., “don’t know,” “maybe,” or “I’ll take a 
guess”), doing so on only 0.3% of all trials. Over 84% of the children never expressed 
uncertainty at all. For the youngest group, if a child gave only “yes” or only “no” answers 
during the first two sets of items, the experimenter gave the child his or her sticker and then 
said, “OK, ready for the next one? Remember, sometimes the answer might be ‘yes,’ and 
sometimes the answer might be ‘no.’ ” This reminder was given to make certain that chil- 
dren realized that they were free to use either answer. 
Items were blocked, with natural kinds in one block and artifacts in the other. The second 
graders received both blocks in a single session, with the order of blocks counterbalanced 
across subjects of each sex within each condition. The preschool children were tested in 
two sessions, usually within 2-3 days of each other. For the preschoolers, the order of 
blocks was also counterbalanced across subjects of each sex within each condition. 
Results 
Overview 
Initial analyses considered overall generalization tendencies (Fig. 1) 
and the extent to which these differed from chance (Table 3). As can be 
seen in Fig. 1, children were sensitive to the generalizability of the prop- 
, Preschoolers Second Graders 
Category Level Category Level 
FIG. 1. Study 1, mean percentage inferences drawn as a function of property type, cate- 
gory level, and age. 
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erty; the three generalizable conditions yielded similar findings and can 
be distinguished from the random responding in the nongeneralizable 
condition. Furthermore, children attended to category level; they drew 
more inferences within the subordinate level (e.g., easy chairs) than 
within the basic level (e.g., chairs), within the basic level than within the 
superordinate level (e.g., furniture), and within the superordinate level 
than to an unrelated picture (e.g., from a chair to a lemon). Children were 
sensitive to these several layers of potentially classifying a single object. 
To compare performance against chance, I classified children’s an- 
swers into response patterns, taking into account how children answered 
for all questions in a given set of four probe questions. Three response 
patterns are considered “sensible,” as they are the only ones for which 
children drew more inferences, the greater the similarity between test 
and target pictures: (a) the child drew an inference only to the picture of 
the same category and similar appearance as the target (e.g, from one 
daffodil to another), (b) the child drew inferences to both pictures of the 
same basic level as the target (e.g., from a daffodil to a daffodil and a 
rose), and (c) the child drew inferences to all three pictures of the same 
superordinate level as the target (e.g., from a daffodil to a daffodil, rose, 
and houseplant). Since children were asked to make one of two re- 
sponses (“yes” or “no”) to each of four items in a set (all the inferences 
from a given target), the total number of possible responses to a set was 
24 = 16. Thus, the probability that a child’s performance would be classi- 
fied into a sensible response pattern is 3/16 or 0.19. 
Table 3 shows the proportion of response patterns within each age, 
property type, and naturalness type that fell within one of the sensible 
response patterns. These proportions far exceeded chance in the three 
TABLE 3 
Study 1, Percentage Sensible Response Patterns (Chance = .19) 




Generalizable for natural kinds 
Natural kinds 
Artifacts 
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generalizable conditions. In contrast, response patterns in the nongener- 
alizable condition were essentially random. Thus, children clearly distin- 
guished between generalizable and nongeneralizable properties. 
I turn next to a detailed consideration of the results, focusing on each 
of the following in turn: (a) category homogeneity, (b) object naturalness, 
and (c) object complexity. Finally, I examine children’s justifications. 
Category Homogeneity 
As discussed in the overview, all children were sensitive to category 
homogeneity as defined by level (e.g., subordinate versus basic level). To 
test the possibility that children were sensitive to the homogeneity of 
each category within the basic level, rank-order correlations were per- 
formed comparing children’s inferences with adults’ ratings of homoge- 
neity, for each category collapsed across subjects. The adult homoge- 
neity ratings were taken from the preliminary study; children’s inferences 
were those to pictures of the same basic-level category but appearance 
different from that of the target. These pictures were chosen because 
they show more variability than pictures of the same category and similar 
appearance. 
There are obvious limitations to comparing children’s inferences with 
adults’ homogeneity ratings, since children’s category representations 
may be biased, incomplete, or otherwise at variance with those of adults 
(e.g., Nelson, 1974). Nonetheless, this analysis yielded some suggestive 
results (see Table 4). The most interesting finding is that 4-year-olds evi- 
denced moderate to high correlations with artifact categories. In other 
words, 4-year-olds drew more inferences within artifact categories that 
adults rated as homogeneous (such as hammers or TVs) than within arti- 
fact categories that adults rated as heterogeneous (such as coats or balls). 
All other correlations were low and nonsignificant. 
TABLE 4 
Correlations between Adult Homogeneity Ratings and Children’s Inferences in Study 1 
Preschool 
NKS ARTIFS 
Equally generalizable .22 .74* 
Generalizable for natural kinds - .08 .72* 
Generalizable for artifacts .13 .36 
Nongenerakable .15 .58 
N 9 9 
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Object Naturalness 
To examine the effects of naturalness, eight composite scores were cal- 
culated for each subject: four for natural kinds and four for artifacts, with 
a score for each category level (subordinate, basic, superordinate, unre- 
lated). Each score was the sum of total “yes” responses (i.e., inferences 
drawn) in each cell. These scores were entered into a 3 (property type) X 
2 (age) x 2 (naturalness) x 4 (category level) ANOVA. Only the three 
generalizable conditions were included, since the nongeneralizable con- 
dition showed mostly random responding (see Table 3).‘j 
As anticipated, category level strongly affected children’s inferences 
(as shown in Fig. l), min-F’(3,116) = 151.33, p < .OOl. (See Clark, 1973, 
for discussion of min-F’ analyses). Furthermore, older children drew 
more inferences overall than younger children (min-F’( 1,102) = 4.30, p < 
.05), although the age effect varied with category level, min-F’(3,279) = 
8.45, p < .Ol. All of the remaining significant differences involved object 
naturalness. There was a naturalness x level interaction, min-F’(3,65) = 
3.85, p < .05, a naturalness x age interaction, min-F’(1,69) = 5.14, p < 
.05, and a naturalness x level x age interaction, min-F’(3,129) = 2.86, p 
< .05. Post hoc comparisons using Scheffe’s test revealed that the natural 
kind-artifact difference was significant only among the second graders 
and emerged only at the basic level (e.g., when drawing an inference from 
a raincoat to a fur coat), p < .05. Overall, there were no significant nat- 
ural kind-artifact differences among preschoolers, or at the other cate- 
gory levels. Figure 2 shows children’s inferences to natural kinds and 
artifacts in each condition.7 
There was also a nonsignificant trend toward a property type x age x 
naturalness x level interaction, min-F’(6,287) = 2.09, p > .05. Thus, a 
further analysis was conducted to examine the effect of specific property 
content on children’s inferences. Of interest is whether children appro- 
priately draw most inferences to natural kinds when taught properties 
that are generalizable for natural kinds, and most inferences to artifacts 
when taught properties that are generalizable for artifacts. By Scheffe’s 
test, preschoolers showed no effects for condition (property type), for 
either natural kinds or artifacts. In contrast, second graders did draw 
inferences differently across conditions. When generalizing within basic- 
level artifact categories (e.g., chairs), second graders appropriately drew 
6 A separate analysis of the nongeneralizable condition confirmed that there were no 
significant natural kind-artifact differences at either age in this condition. 
’ Preschoolers’ roughly 50% performance is primarily due to individual differences: 63% 
of the preschoolers gave either more or fewer inferences than would be expected by chance 
on a binomial test, p < .OS, for items of the same category and different appearance. 
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Preschoolers Second Greders 
Condition Condition 
FIG. 2. Studies 1 and 2, generahzable conditions. Mean percentage inferences drawn to 
natural kinds and artifacts of the same basic-level category, different appearance. 
fewest inferences for properties that are generalizable for natural kinds 
(e.g., “has urethane inside”), p < .05. The only other significant differ- 
ence occurred for second graders when generalizing within natural kind 
superordinates (e.g., from a spider to a bee). There, children drew more 
inferences for properties that are generalizable to artifacts (e.g., “used 
for expunction”) than for properties that are equally generalizable (e.g., 
“catches bestiolas”), by Scheffe’s p < .05. This last result was unantici- 
pated, but suggests that functional properties (those generalizable to arti- 
facts) may be especially likely to characterize an entire superordinate cat- 
egory. 
Object Complexitya 
Three levels of object complexity were defined, for both natural kinds 
and artifacts (see “Categories and Exemplars,” above). The different 
levels of complexity for natural kinds represent different ontological cate- 
gories (substances versus vegetation versus animals; see Keil, 1979) and 
different content domains. Given recent evidence that children clearly 
distinguish between animate and inanimate objects (Gelman & Spelke, 
1981; Gelman, Spelke, & Meek, 1983), and to some extent between ob- 
s On an analysis including the items used in Study 1, complexity is not significantly cor- 
related with homogeneity for natural kinds separately, artifacts separately, or all items com- 
bined (all p > .05, by Spearman’s p). 
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jects and substances (Keil, 1979; Smith, Carey, & Wiser, 1985), we may 
expect children to draw most inferences to animals and fewest to sub- 
stances. Complexity differences for artifacts, although as fully pro- 
nounced as those for natural kinds as measured by adult ratings, do not 
correspond to ontological differences. The complexity analyses were 
conducted primarily in order to elucidate the natural kind-artifact dis- 
tinction. Thus, the analyses focused on the level that yielded a natural 
kind-artifact distinction to begin with: pictures of the same category as 
the target but of different appearance (e.g., a digital clock, where the 
target was an analog clock). Only the three generalizable conditions were 
included. 
A 3 (property type) x 2 (age) x 2 (naturalness) ANOVA was con- 
ducted. Effects for age, naturalness, and property type were discussed in 
the previous section, so this analysis will report only those effects in- 
volving complexity. There was a significant main effect for complexity, 
F(2,180) = 22.40, p < .OOOl, and a complexity x naturalness interaction, 
F(2,180) = 24.72, p < .OOOl. (Min-F’ analyses were not conducted be- 
cause there were too few items per complexity level to make such an 
analysis meaningful.) Complexity did not interact with either age or prop- 
erty type. The complexity x naturalness interaction is shown in Fig. 3. 
As can be seen, substances promoted the fewest inferences among nat- 
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FIG. 3. Study 1, generalizable conditions. Mean number of inferences (out of 3) drawn to 
pictures of the same basic-level category, different appearance as a function of complexity 
and age. 
82 SUSAN A. GELMAN 
facts.9 In contrast to expectations, there was no evidence of a strict ani- 
mate-inanimate distinction, at either age; children did not treat animals 
any differently from vegetation (at either age) or complex artifacts (at 
preschool age). Despite the significant effects for complexity, complexity 
per se cannot account for children’s answers, since inferences did not 
increase monotonically with object complexity. This was especially evi- 
dent with the artifacts, where children consistently drew fewer inferences 
to the medium-complex artifacts than to either the simple or the complex 
artifacts. Furthermore, only one rank-order correlation conducted be- 
tween adult complexity ratings and children’s inductions was significant: 
that of second graders drawing inferences to natural kinds in the general- 
izable for natural kinds condition (Spearman’s p = .73, p < .05). 
Justifications 
All of children’s spontaneous comments were coded as to their content 
(as detailed below). A second coder rated 25% of the set, yielding agree- 
ment of 84%. The first analysis examined whether children translated the 
unfamiliar words they heard into something more familiar. We coded 
every time a child translated an unfamiliar word (e.g., for alfalfa, “That’s 
carrots”), gave a partial translation (e.g., “That’s probably something 
like carrots or lettuce”), gave a questioning translation (e.g., “Like a 
carrot?“), or outright asked what the word meant (e.g., “What is al- 
falfa?“). Nontranslations were coded as well, e.g., “Some rabbits like to 
eat carrots, too,” which by their wording imply that the child did not 
translate the novel word into a familiar one. Finally, we coded each time 
the child claimed to know the unfamiliar word. Altogether across both 
ages and all generalizable conditions, 172 comments fell into these cate- 
gories. Most typically, children treated the novel words as unfamiliar; 
they claimed to know the meaning only 6 times and translated the word 
directly only 18 times (with 15/18 translations made by the preschoolers). 
9 Given that substances were the only nonobject categories and did seem to function 
differently from other natural kinds, two additional analyses were performed excluding sub- 
stances. (a) The homogeneity ratings were recalculated for natural kinds. Although all cor- 
relations increased when substances were removed, none reached significance. (b) A prop- 
erty type x age x naturalness x level ANOVA was conducted excluding the substance 
items. On this analysis, preschoolers showed more of a natural kind-artifact difference than 
in the main analysis, for pictures of the same basic level as the target but of different appear- 
ance. However, the natural kind-artifact difference among the preschoolers still failed to 
reach significance across the three property types by Scheffe’s test, and there was no sig- 
nificant interaction with property type. Moreover, the naturalness effect was still signiS- 
cantly more pronounced among the second-grade children than among preschoolers, as 
shown by a naturalness x level x age interaction, min-F’ (3, 118) = 3.27, p < .05. 
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Forty-three of the comments were partial translations or questioning 
translations, and 100 of the comments were nontranslations (33) or out- 
right asking what the word meant (67). 
It is also important to determine how often children explicitly invoked 
the category name when drawing an inference. Children may have in- 
voked category names to explain or justify their answers, in effect saying, 
“I drew [did not draw] that inference because that object is a [category 
name]. ’ ’ If so, children should have shown the following patterns of 
naming: When children made an inference (by saying “yes”), they 
should have named the level at which the two pictures share a category; 
e.g., when drawing an inference from a golf ball to a football, they should 
have said “It’s a ball” or “It’s a toy,” not “It’s a football.” When 
drawing an inference from a golf ball to a doll, they should have said, 
“It’s a toy,” not “It’s a doll.” In contrast, when children refused to draw 
an inference (by saying “no”), they should have named the level at which 
the two pictures were members of contrasting categories below a 
common superordinate: “It’s a football” when comparing a football to a 
golfball, or “It’s a ball” or “It’s a football” when comparing a football to 
a doll. In other words, if children were basing their answers on category 
membership, then they should have adjusted their level of naming to con- 
form to the appropriate contrast. 
Because of the small number of comments, the data were collapsed 
across the three generalizable conditions, across naturalness, and across 
age of child. The data are quite clear. When children said “yes,” 84% of 
their labels (59 out of 70) referred to a category that was common to both 
target and test pictures. When children said “no,” 92% of their labels (68 
out of 74) referred to a level at which the pictures were members of con- 
trasting categories. Chance scores were calculated for each of the three 
levels of word provided (subordinate, basic, and superordinate) and for 
each level of generality of item .I0 Overall, chance alone would predict 
that 99 of children’s labels (69%) would be appropriate. However, sub- 
jects gave 127 appropriate labels (88% of the total). Therefore, it appears 
that children supplied category labels in order to justify their answers. 
The nongeneralizable condition provides an important control. Only 
lo Chance levels were calculated for each of the three types of names (subordinate, basic, 
and superordinate) and for each level of item (subordinate, basic, superordinate, and unre- 
lated). The total number of names of a given type supplied at each item level was multiplied 
by the proportion of answers to that item level that would be consistent with a label of that 
sort (e.g., the number of basic-level names given to basic-level items was multiplied by the 
proportion of times subjects said “yes” on basic-level items). A calculation was then per- 
formed of how many labels were predicted to conform to the appropriate pattern and how 
many labels actually did conform to the pattern. 
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three justifications in that condition included a category label at all. Thus, 
children spontaneously justified their answers by invoking the category 
label and only where appropriate. 
Comments about appearances were coded into three types: those that 
mentioned that the pictures looked alike or the same, those that men- 
tioned that the pictures looked different, and all other descriptions of 
appearance. The first result of interest is that children mentioned simi- 
larity of appearance only when drawing an inference (22/22 instances). 
Second, when children commented on some difference in appearance be- 
tween target and test pictures, they also often did so when drawing an 
inference (46/65 instances). That is, children often qualified a “yes” an- 
swer with some comment such as, “but they look different.” Children 
readily drew inferences from one category member to another, despite 
explicitly noted differences in appearance. 
Discussion 
Study 1 was designed to map out children’s inductive inferences across 
a range of categories and properties. For each of a series of problems, 
children learned a fact about an object and had the opportunity to gener- 
alize the fact to other objects. These problems posed a strong test of 
children’s inference abilities, in part because each new property was 
taught about a single object only. This was also a strong test in that each 
new fact included an unfamiliar word. Consequently, children could have 
interpreted the properties in any idiosyncratic way. For example, “has a 
spleen inside” could refer to what the rabbit ate for lunch, rather than an 
internal organ. Therefore this study may actually have underestimated 
children’s tendency to draw inferences within a category. 
Nonetheless, children consistently drew inferences within each cate- 
gory. As in previous work (Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987), inferences 
were not dependent on perceptual similarity. Children drew many infer- 
ences when the target and probe were markedly dissimilar (e.g., from a 
daffodil to a rose), especially for natural kinds. In their justifications, too, 
children indicated that inferences were based on category identity more 
than surface similarity; they often named the category that was appro- 
priate for explaining their response and drew inferences despite re- 
marking on perceptual dissimilarity. 
The results from this study can tell us what children’s early inferences 
are based on and how they change with age. The patterns of response 
were markedly different at each age. I-year-olds were sensitive to two 
domain-general factors: category homogeneity and property generaliz- 
ability. They drew predictably more inferences, the more similar the 
probe items were to the target. For example, when children learned that a 
color TV has parts made out of quercus, they were most likely to gener- 
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alize to another color TV, less likely to generalize to a black-and-white 
TV, even less likely to generalize to a radio, and least likely to generalize 
to a mouse. To the extent that two objects were alike in known ways, 
children presumed they were alike in unknown ways as well. Further- 
more, preschool children’s inferences within basic-level categories corre- 
lated significantly with adult homogeneity ratings. That is, children were 
especially likely to draw inferences within those basic-level artifact cate- 
gories that adults rated as very homogeneous. The results suggest that 
4-year-olds may be especially sensitive to category homogeneity as they 
perceive it. 
The patterns just described did not emerge in the nongeneralizable 
condition, where the properties taught were temporary or accidental 
(e.g., “This clock has a little scratch”). This result reveals a powerful 
constraint on children’s inductions. By age 4, then, children expect to 
find deep similarities among category members, regardless of the cate- 
gory. They are also sensitive to the breadth of the category in drawing 
inferences. And they are sensitive to how transient versus enduring the 
property is. 
Second graders also relied on category level and property generaliz- 
ability to guide induction. They, too, drew fewer inferences to superor- 
dinate or unrelated than basic level categories. And again this pattern was 
disrupted in the nongeneralizable condition. Beyond such similarities, 
however, marked changes took place in the 3 years from preschool to 
second grade. The major developmental difference is one of refinement: 
4-year-olds made few principled distinctions among categories; second 
graders made several. This was most evident in a shift from a small and 
unstable natural kind-artifact distinction among 4-year-olds to a large, 
consistent distinction among second graders. Second-grade children de- 
veloped clearly different expectations about natural kinds (especially bio- 
logical kinds such as “rabbit” and “apple”) and artifact categories (such 
as “chair” and “hammer”). They expected to find rich similarities 
among natural kinds -in behavior, internal parts, and previous life form 
-but not among artifacts. In fact, second graders overextended the nat- 
ural kind-artifact distinction, invoking it even when unwarranted, as 
seen in the equally generalizable condition and, to a lesser extent, in the 
generalizable for artifacts condition. 
Second graders also showed more highly differentiated patterns based 
on property content; when considering artifact categories, second-grade 
children drew the fewest inferences from properties that are generalizable 
for natural kinds (such as internal parts). 
STUDY 2: CHILD-SUPPLIED PROPERTIES 
In Study 1, patterns of induction differed strikingly depending on 
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whether children had heard generalizable properties (e.g., “This apple 
has pectin inside”) or nongeneralizable properties (e.g., “This apple has 
a little scratch on it”). It was argued that preschool children honor a 
principled distinction between enduring and more transient properties, 
expecting only the former to promote category-based inductions. How- 
ever, the generalizable-nongeneralizable distinction in Study 1 was con- 
founded with whether or not the property included an unfamilar word. 
Study 2 was conducted to determine whether similar patterns of results 
are obtained when the generalizable properties include only familiar 
properties. The procedure was identical to that of Study 1 except that 
children were asked to supply the properties themselves. 
Method 
Subjects 
Thirty-two children participated in this study, 16 each at two ages: 4-year-olds from two 
preschools in Sunnyvale, California (range = 4-l to 5-4; mean age = 4-9) and second 
graders from two elementary schools in the same area (range = 7-7 to 8-5; mean age = 
8-O). Nine 4-year-olds and eight second graders were girls. None of the children had 
participated in Study 1. 
Items 
The same picture sets as in Study 1 were used, including the warm-up questions. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that of Study 1, except that each child supplied all proper- 
ties rather than learning them from the experimenter. More specifically, on each item the 
experimenter framed a question based on the property given in the equally generalizable 
condition of Study 1. The child’s answer to this question became the property that was used 
to test his or her inductions from that item. The questions were derived from the equally 
generalizable condition because it concerned familiar content domains, and so the questions 
should be possible for children to answer. For example, on one set children in Study 1 had 
been told, “This [target] rabbit likes to eat alfalfa. Does this rabbit [dog, phone] like to eat 
alfalfa, like this rabbit?” In Study 2, the wording was, “What does this [target] rabbit like to 
eat?” If the child said, for example, “lettuce,” the experimenter would ask, “Does this 
rabbit [dog, phone] like to eat lettuce, like this rabbit. 7” The questions used to elicit the 
properties presented all information but the unfamiliar word. 
Results and Discussion 
The major results from Study 1 were replicated; 81% of children’s in- 
ferences followed sensible patterns (as defined in Table 3 of Study 1). 
Thus, the generalizable-nongeneralizable distinction in Study 1 could 
not be due to differences in property familiarity. Moreover, the relative 
advantage for natural kinds again emerged between preschool and second 
grade. A 2 (age) x 2 (naturalness) x 4 (level) ANOVA was conducted on 
the inference scores in this study. There was a significant age x natural- 
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ness x level interaction, min-F’(3,114) = 3.28, p < .05. As in Study 1, 
the natural kind-artifact distinction was found for pictures of the same 
category but different appearance than the target (see Fig. 2 for illustra- 
tion). Furthermore, I conducted an ANOVA comparing the results of the 
present study with the results of the equally generalizable condition in 
Study 1 (assuming for the purpose of this analysis that subjects in the two 
studies were comparable). On this analysis, there were no significant 
main effects or interactions based on property type (whether the property 
was unfamiliar or child supplied); all p > .05. In sum, children’s infer- 
ences concerning novel properties follow patterns similar to their beliefs 
about familiar facts. 
STUDY 3: CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURAL KINDS 
AND ARTIFACTS 
Given that the natural kind-artifact distinction does not emerge con- 
sistently until second grade, it is important to determine whether children 
grasp the distinction on a literal level. It could be that preschoolers do not 
know enough about the origins of things to know which objects are 
human made and which are not. This could contribute to their failure to 
make a natural kind-artifact distinction when drawing inductive infer- 
ences. On the other hand, if preschoolers do understand the literal dis- 
tinction between artifacts and natural kinds, then some other develop- 
mental change is required to explain the different patterns of inferences 
by second grade. 
Study 3 examined whether children realize that only artifacts are 
human made. It was possible that children might have some difftculty 
with the question, given previous research by Piaget (1929). In The 
Child’s Conception of the World, Piaget describes young children as “ar- 
tificialist,” or “regarding things as the product of human creation, rather 
than in attributing creative activity to the things themselves” (p. 253). 
For example, children reported that the sun and the mountains were cre- 
ated by humans for human purposes. Study 3 differs from the Piagetian 
procedure in two ways. First, children were interviewed about a range of 
familiar, accessible objects (such as lemons and birds), rather than re- 
mote phenomena about which they have less direct experience. Second, 
children were specifically asked whether or not the objects were made by 
humans. In contrast, Piaget’s interviews were more open ended, for ex- 
ample, often including the question, “How are clouds (snow, stones, 
mountains) made?” Such wording requires the child to report not only 
whether the object is human made, but also to specify what the process 
was-a more difficult question. Furthermore, such wording may incor- 
rectly imply that someone actually did make the clouds and snow. The 
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simpler procedure in Study 3 provides a more sensitive test of children’s 
grasp of the natural kind-artifact distinction. 
Method 
Subjects 
Ninety-six children participated in the study: 48 preschoolers from a single preschool in 
Sunnyvale, California (range = 4- 1 to 5-2; mean age = 4-8) and 48 second-graders from a 
single elementary school in the same city (range = 7-l to 8-7; mean age = 7-11). 
Twenty-seven of the younger children and 30 of the older children were girls. All children 
participated in Study 1. 
Items 
Natural kinds included two animals (tiger, bird), two types of vegetation (lemon, tree), 
and two substances (milk, salt). Artifacts included two categories each at three levels of 
complexity: simple (hat, knife), medium (doll, book), and complex (car, telephone). 
Procedure 
This study was conducted directly after Study 1, as part of the same session. At the end 
of Study 1, the experimenter said, “I’m going to ask you a few questions without any 
pictures. Do you think people make X’s?” (where X is a category name). If the child an- 
swered, “Yes,” this was followed by, “How?” If the child answered, “No,” he or she was 
asked, “Why not?” The follow-up questions were included to clarify children’s answers. 
Occasionally a child said, “I don’t know” to the follow-up question, so another prompt was 
given, e.g., “Where do they come from ?” Each child was tested on six categories, either all 
natural kinds or all artifact categories. Within each age group, condition in Study 1, and 
order of blocks in Study 1, roughly half the children heard natural kind questions; the others 
heard artifact questions. Altogether, 50 children (25 at each age) answered questions about 
natural kinds; 46 children (23 at each age) answered questions about artifacts. The order of 
categories was randomly determined for each child. 
Results and Discussion 
At the most literal level, children clearly grasp the natural kind-arti- 
fact distinction; they realize that humans can construct only artifacts and 
not natural kinds. Each child received a composite score that counted the 
number of times he or she said that objects of a particular type (e.g., cars) 
are made by people, Because every child was tested on six object catego- 
ries, scores could range from 0 to 6. Then a 2 (age) x 2 (naturalness) 
ANOVA was conducted. On this analysis, children more often said that 
people make artifacts (84%) than that people make natural kinds (23%), 
as seen by a main effect for naturalness, min-F’(1,16) = 36.52, p < .OOl. 
There was also an age x naturalness interaction, indicating that second 
graders were more pronounced than preschoolers in their natural kind- 
artifact distinction, min-F’(1,39) = 9.60, p < .Ol. They were more apt to 
say that people make artifacts and less apt to say that people make nat- 
ural kinds. Nonetheless, even the preschoolers clearly believe that arti- 
facts tend to be human made and that natural kinds are not. A x2 was 
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calculated, based on the number of preschoolers who said “yes” no 
more than half the time (zero to three times out of six possible) and the 
number who said “yes” most of the time (four to six times out of six 
possible), for natural kinds and artifacts separately. Sixteen out of 23 
children said “yes” most of the time for artifacts; only 3 out of 25 chil- 
dren said “yes” most of the time for natural kinds, x2 (df = 1) = 16.60, p 
-=c .OOl. 
Although the overall natural-artificial distribution is quite strong, chil- 
dren at both ages often reported that substances are human made (mean 
= 50% at younger age, 41% at older age). This is reflected in a two-way 
ANOVA conducted on the natural kinds data, revealing a main effect for 
complexity (animal, vegetation, or substance) (F(2,96) = 39.33, p < 
.OOl), as well as for age (F(1,48) = 6.09, p < .OS). It appears that children 
have not mastered a strict natural kind-artifact distinction, but rather a 
distinction between artifacts and living things. This result does need to be 
interpreted with caution, however. Even adults could legitimately con- 
sider milk and salt to be human made, in that both are prepared by 
humans before being consumed. 
Justifications. After answering “yes” or “no,” each child was asked 
either “How?” or “Why not?“, respectively. These justifications were 
written down and coded as to their content (see Table 5). A second coder 
rated 25% of the justifications, yielding 91% agreement. Disagreements 
were resolved by discussion. 
Four-year-olds had some difficulty articulating their answers, as noted 
by the large proportion of anomalous or nonexistent justifications. Fur- 
thermore, the details of children’s answers at both ages were often incor- 
rect. For example, one preschooler said that telephones are made “with 
wood and tape”; several second graders explained that salt grows or that 
it comes from a plant. Given children’s lack of precise knowledge con- 
cerning these categories, it is all the more impressive that they are aware 
TABLE 5 




Characteristic of living thing 53” 0 
Made by God 14” 2 
Parts, substance, ingredients 10 3w 
Tool or process 1 25” 
Other 79 89 
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that artifacts are made by humans, whereas certain natural kinds (animals 
and vegetation) are not human made. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Children draw inductive inferences based on category membership 
from an early age. The fact that children made as many inferences in 
these studies as they did is consistent with previous research (Gelman & 
Markman, 1986) and is itself important, given the unfamiliarity of the 
properties and the fact that each property was taught about a single pic- 
ture only. Yet children readily drew inferences, sometimes generalizing 
from a single instance to all or most of the category. For example, when 
shown a picture of a fish and told it needed branchias to breathe, one 
second grader replied, “All fish need branchias to breathe, probably.” 
Another second grader, when told that a certain rabbit had an omentum 
inside, replied, “If one of ‘em has it, all of ‘em have to have it.” In fact, 
when asked about a single instance, children often talked about an un- 
specified plurality of objects (e.g., “They [ants] bite you”). Children in- 
voked category labels to justify their inferences and drew inferences de- 
spite marked dissimilarities in appearances (see Study 1, “Justifica- 
tions”). Given the ease with which children generalize to category 
members from a single fact, they face the problem of induction: a need 
for constraints. 
Two factors influence the extent of induction from the preschool age: 
category homogeneity and property generalizability. The importance of 
homogeneity implies that categories which are richly structured in their 
known properties (homogeneous categories) are assumed to capture 
many unknown properties as well. Conversely, categories that share rela- 
tively many dissimilarities on the surface are less likely to promote in- 
ductive inferences. Reliance on homogeneity may be a sensible default 
strategy. It is probably often the case, for many object categories, that 
perceived homogeneity roughly predicts homogeneity of underlying 
properties (such as internal parts and subtle behaviors). For a person 
with limited knowledge, such as a preschooler, homogeneity could serve 
as a useful (though fallible) heuristic, Property generalizability is also 
very relevant to preschoolers. Nongeneralizable properties such as tran- 
sient or accidental facts are assumed not to follow “sensible” or lawlike 
patterns of induction. Note that the distinctions made by preschoolers 
indicate an early sensitivity to aspects of both the type of category and 
the type of property. The early acquisition of such constraints suggests 
that preschool children limit their inductive inferences in basically cor- 
rect ways. These two factors can be considered domain general, in that 
they do not take into account the specifics of the category or property 
content. Thus, no particular type of category has a special status at this 
age. 
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Despite the importance of domain-general constraints on induction, 
from other research we know that preschool children override similarity 
in certain telling cases. One case that has already been mentioned is 
when category identity (at a basic level) conflicts with surface similarity 
(Gelman et al., 1986; Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987). A second case is 
presented by Carey (1985), who demonstrates that children use more 
than surface similarity to structure their inferences within the superor- 
dinate categories “animal” and “living thing.” At times children’s infer- 
ences directly conflicted with perceptual similarity; e.g., children were 
more likely to draw inferences from humans to stink-bugs than from bees 
to stink-bugs, despite the greater similarity within the latter pair. In fact, 
their inferences from humans to stink-bugs (a superordinate-level infer- 
ence) is quite high, although presumably no higher than inferences would 
be within the category of humans. Carey’s results do not conflict with 
those presented here, since these studies did not examine homogeneity 
within superordinate-level categories. However, her data can be used to 
extend our interpretation of the present results. Although preschool chil- 
dren appear to be more dependent on domain-general factors than are 
older children, they are also sensitive to the particulars of the category 
when drawing inferences. Thus, any theory of induction for preschoolers 
must include three factors: (a) attention to homogeneity and property 
generalizability, perhaps as default heuristics; (b) attention to category 
labels, such that inferences within categories are favored over inferences 
between categories; and (c) some reliance on domain-specific knowledge 
or beliefs (e.g., of humans as the prototypical animal). 
Despite the initial headway that preschoolers have made, the present 
studies suggest that their inferences are not sufficiently constrained, nor 
are they sufficiently sensitive to domain-specific considerations. There is 
no consistent natural kind-artifact distinction at this age. To 4-year-olds, 
two apples are no more likely to have the same internal parts than a golf 
ball and a football. Likewise, preschoolers honor no consistent differ- 
ences based on the content of generalizable properties. They draw infer- 
ences concerning internal parts and function equally often, for both nat- 
ural kinds and artifacts. 
The conclusion that there is no consistent natural kind-artifact distinc- 
tion among preschoolers does need to be viewed with caution, given the 
difficulty of assuming that children and adults interpreted the properties 
in the same way. For example, “This chair has urethane inside” could be 
interpreted as, “This chair has substance inside,” which is in fact true of 
most chairs. Thus, depending on how children interpreted these proper- 
ties, it is possible that a natural kind-artifact distinction would not 
always be appropriate. However, there are three reasons to place confi- 
dence in the developmental difference that emerged: (a) The equally gen- 
eralizable properties are more specific than either the generalizable for 
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natural kinds or the generalizable for artifacts properties and so more 
highly constrain subjects’ interpretations of the novel words. Accord- 
ingly, these properties should be less open to alternative interpretations. 
Nonetheless the same developmental pattern emerged for these proper- 
ties as for the others: preschoolers did not significantly distinguish be- 
tween natural kinds and artifacts; second graders did. (b) In Study 2 no 
unfamiliar words were used, and children generated the properties them- 
selves, thus presumably reducing possible misinterpretations of the prop- 
erties. Again, the same developmental pattern emerged. (c) In a follow- 
up study by Gelman and O’Reilly (in press), children were asked open- 
ended questions concerning internal parts (e.g., “Do all dogs [spiders, 
chairs, vacuums, etc.] have the same kinds of stuff inside?“). These 
questions were designed to eliminate unfamiliar words which could be 
interpreted in idiosyncratic ways. The results again were that preschool 
children did not distinguish between natural kinds and artifacts, whereas 
second graders did. 
Development is rapid within the brief period from preschool to second 
grade. Most strikingly, second graders make principled distinctions 
among categories and properties that younger children do not honor. The 
major accomplishment is that older children draw more inferences within 
natural kinds (e.g., carrots) than within artifact categories (e.g., balls), 
even with properties that were selected to be equally generalizable for 
natural kinds and artifacts, and even with functional properties that were 
designed to generalize from artifacts only. In fact, the older children 
maintain that familiar properties, designed to be equally true of natural 
kinds and artifacts, hold true more often for natural kinds than artifacts 
(Study 2). Their natural kind-artifact distinction is a tenacious one. 
Given the above-mentioned difficulties with controlling for children’s in- 
terpretations of the properties, it is all the more impressive that second- 
grade children do clearly draw more inferences from natural kinds than 
from artifacts. Furthermore, second graders are sensitive to property 
content. When considering artifact categories, older children draw fewest 
inferences concerning properties generalizable for natural kinds. And the 
natural kind-artifact difference is smallest with properties that are gen- 
eralizable for artifacts. These distinctions are on the whole appropriate. 
One can characterize the developmental shift as one from relatively 
domain-general to relatively domain-specific considerations. Younger 
children rely on domain-general strategies more heavily, perhaps because 
of their relative lack of knowledge on which to draw for making distinc- 
tions among categories and properties. By second grade, inductive infer- 
ences are sensitive to the nature of the category, the domain, and the 
property being taught. Thus, it seems that domain-specific knowledge 
and beliefs are underlying these patterns of inferences. It may be that 
children at both ages (as well as adults) use domain-specific knowledge 
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when available, but rely on domain-general strategies (such as homoge- 
neity) as a default. 
What is the cause of developmental change? It is not simply that nat- 
ural kinds have developed a special status in children’s inductive infer- 
ences. The claim is not that the literal distinction (i.e., whether or not an 
object is naturally occurring) is the psychologically relevant variable. 
Note that children at both ages draw relatively few inferences to sub- 
stances. Furthermore, preschoolers grasp the literal natural kind-artifact 
distinction (see Study 3) but do not make use of it when drawing induc- 
tive inferences. Rather, I propose that natural kind categories promote 
more inferences because for second graders they tie into more richly ar- 
ticulated theories: (1) they are perceived as being more homogeneous in 
their as-yet-unknown properties, because they are more limited than arti- 
facts in their structure and makeup; and (2) they tend to tie into richer 
domains of scientific knowledge. As children’s theories change, so do the 
sophistication and complexity of their inferences. 
In support of this claim, let us consider what children are learning 
about natural kinds by this age. Between preschool and second grade, 
children learn that animals and plants support rich causal explanations 
that artifacts do not. For example, by the age that children show a reli- 
able natural kind-artifact distinction in their inductions, children have 
also worked out that members of a natural kind must have the same in- 
ternal structure, whereas members of an artifact category need not (Keil, 
1986). Furthermore, children are learning that living things need certain 
properties in order to support life and produce offspring (Carey, 1985). 
Artifacts certainly do not share these properties and tend not to support 
analogously theory-rich, category-general facts. In other words, only the 
older children in these studies are beginning to understand animals and 
plants as distinctly biological categories (thus being explainable by a dis- 
tinctive set of laws). Thus, increasing knowledge yields differentiation 
among categories: animals and plants afford rich causal explanations; ar- 
tifacts do not. Younger children instead seem to treat all categories as 
explainable by the same kinds of laws. 
Another indication that the advantage for natural kinds emerges from 
their status as more highly developed theoretical constructs is that for 
natural kinds, fewest inferences are drawn to the substances. Corre- 
spondingly, knowledge about substances seems especially late devel- 
oping (Smith et al., 1985; Study 3 of the present paper). It is interesting 
that substances promote so few inductions for children, given that adults 
draw more inferences within categories of substances than categories of 
plants and animals (S. Gelman & E. M. Markman, unpublished data). 
Clearly, more research is needed beyond these examples. However, it 
seems reasonable to propose that one major developmental change from 
preschool to second grade tapped in these studies is an increased under- 
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standing of biology. The present data support Carey (1985) and Keil 
(1986) in suggesting that the very status of basic-level biological catego- 
ries (e.g., rabbit, tree) is changing with increasing scientific knowledge. 
More generally, I am suggesting that emergence of new theoretical do- 
mains leads to more powerful, more highly differentiated inductive infer- 
ences . 
In addition to what it can tell us about the organization of children’s 
knowledge, the present work has implications for how to consider cate- 
gories more generally. In the psychological literature most views of cate- 
gories focus on known properties and how they are represented. Often 
categories are assumed to be static, unchanging, and fully formed, with 
meanings that are explicitly known to all adults in the community. In 
contrast, the present studies demonstrate that categories are open ended 
in the sense of allowing for new information and that they can eventually 
dovetail with scientific knowledge. Comparison of the present work with 
others (Carey, 1985; Keil, 1986) suggests that by second grade, growing 
scientific expertise becomes important to how children organize knowl- 
edge and draw inferences. And even earlier, children expect categories to 
capture more than obvious properties. A full account of what makes 
something a useful category and how categories function will have to deal 
with these phenomena. 
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